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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis conducts inquiries in a 
wide range of fields in which systemic problems occur: energy, food and agriculture, 
resources and the environment, human settlements and services, management and tech-
nology, the theoretical tools needed for such analyses, and others. The problems dealt 
with cover a spectrum from those of perception and understanding to quite practical 
recommendations for improved courses of action. And the results of this work are widely 
communicated to audiences including both specialists and persons with broad interests 
and responsibilities. 
Thus, the Institute is concerned not only with the knowledge and techniques from 
the many disciplines that enter into applied systems analyses but also with the craft 
skills needed to conduct a good systems analysis and to communicate its results effec-
tively to its intended audiences. 
One result of this latter concern is that the Institute devotes some effort to under-
standing matters relating to this craft, both to improve its own work, and to communi-
cate this craft knowledge to a wider audience. 
This paper, written while its author was Chairman of the Institute's Management 
and Technology Area, discusses some important craft issues for systems analysis. It was 
originally given as an invited address at the closing session of EURO III at Amsterdam 
in the summer of 1979. 
ROGER LEVIEN 
Director 
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1. Introduction 
A colleague of mine once said that there were two 
kinds of people in the world - those who believed 
that there were two kinds of people in the world, and 
those who did not. It is a good point; for the tempta-
tion to simplify and divide the world into a small 
number of distinct categories is very great . It is also 
very dangerous. 
The history of operational research and systems 
analysis is strong evidence of this tendency. In order 
to define the subject it has been successively nar-
rowed down, renamed as part of the broadening pro-
cess, narrowed, renamed, etc., etc. There is no longer 
even a commonly accepted name that describes what 
I practice and am now talking about. I shall call it 
ORASA [I] . 
Definitions are necessarily of the form 'ORASA 
is . .. ' and various writers and speakers, having failed 
with single definitions, have tried to produce sets of 
statements that will define the subject more precisely. 
Go to any meeting on the subject and listen for the 
dogmatic statements. They are all inadequate, and 
are , I believe, doomed to be so . For our subject is 
unalterably complex, as complex as the reality we 
study - the reality of decision-making in a social 
context. Such reality can only be contained within 
dogmatic statements if those statements are so bland 
as to be uninformative . I have come to believe that 
dogmatic axioms about our subject are incorrect, 
and therefore lies, and dangerous lies at that. If that 
seems to be an overstatement let me remind you that 
the most dangerous lies are those that 
(a) contain a large element of truth, 
(b) say what the listener wants to hear . 
Such dogmatic statements are dangerous. They have 
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the persuasive power of truth but they are, at the 
best, near-truths. 
One response to this belief would be to tum away 
from any serious attempt at definition. 'ORASA is 
what I do', is one response. A more honest path is to 
accept the complexity of life for what it is , to replace 
the axioms by near-truths and to analyse with care 
what the elements of truth and untruth may be. The 
result may not be a logical dichotomy - it will lead 
to a genuine understanding. 
I propose , therefore , to describe seven 'near-
truths' , which would for the most part be strongly 
accepted by ORASA practitioners. But none of them 
are absolute truths , and they contain the seeds of 
disaster if their limitations are not recognised. In 
truth, they are dangerous. 
2 . Near truth No. I - ORASA is problem solving 
This is perhaps the most important and therefore 
dangerous near-truth of all, simply because the truth 
of it is so important. The truth has to be stated and 
restated with power and persistence , since it is the 
very essence of the subject. The most dangerous 
opponents ofORASA are those who would try to 
push the subject into some easily labelled pigeon-
hole , such as 'mathematical techniques' . 1 It is easy to 
understand why such attempts are made so repeti-
tively. Life in most organisations, and particularly in 
universities, is regulated by the concept of func-
tionalism. Everyone has to be defined by his function 
or his field of knowledge . If only one could 'place' 
the ORASA expert as, say, the person to call on when 
there is a computer problem to solve, or a piece of 
mathematical analysis to be done . This would make it 
easier to place ORASA staff in the hierarchy, as well 
as leaving it easy to decide when ORASA should be 
called in . It becomes a service function, safely remote 
from policy questions. 
This is , of course , not what ORASA is about . It 
1 Indeed it is because the phrase 'operations research' seems 
to have become so closely identified with 'technique' -
that I have been forced to coin my own phrase ORASA, 
which could be interpreted as Operational Research and/or 
Applied Systems Analysis. 
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is about problems, real situations where people and 
organisations have to cope with issues they do not 
fully understand, and where an adequate answer can-
not be provided by experience, either of the decision-
makers or their technical advisers. ORASA started, 
and had some of its most spectacular successes, in the 
period 1937-1945 when there were no techniques 
available and when the problems facing the military 
decision-makers were immediate and could not be 
deferred. From the start the subject was problem 
oriented and, incidentally, scientific, systemic and 
non-disciplinary. Problems must be tackled as they 
are, with the full range of knowledge and techniques 
obtainable from any source brought to bear in a 
coordinated approach. That is still the ORASA way. 
But, is it necessarily problem-solving? It is true 
that if you look at the work of any in-house team, 
you will find many tasks, both at strategic and tactical 
levels, that clearly are problem solving. They may 
concern an investment proposal, a logistic operation 
or perhaps some question of organisation or proce-
dure . A clear requirement is formulated and the 
answer is provided in the form of a proposal, a 
statistical statement, or a computer program. The 
problem is 'solved'. Most of the identifiable financial 
savings in industrial ORASA teams come from such 
work. Nevertheless, the Operational Research Execu-
tive of the National Coal Board discovered that over 
a period of years only 15% of their tasks came into 
this category, although the financial returns covered 
more than twice the costs of the Executive. The 
remaining 85% of the _work could not be so described, 
and yet management supported it with the greatest 
enthusiasm. What kind of work was it then? 
The answer to that question is contained in the 
Appendices to a paper by Sir Derek Ezra [2] - the 
Chairman of the National Coal Board - in which he 
described the work of the Executive. These Appen-
dices list some of the achievements of the group in 
1975/76. Although some of the non-quantifiable 
achievements are still essentially of a problem solving 
nature, most of the work can best be described as 
creating understanding. And, of course, that is often 
the prime thing that managers required. They cer-
tainly do not want decisions to be taken for them; 
indeed, they will usually make sure that they are not. 
But the good managers do want to be as sure as they 
can that they know the likely consequences of any 
action they can. That is a matter of understanding. 
Now sometimes understanding can be obtained 
through the reading of a report, without any real 
interaction between the analyst and the managers or 
policy-makers concerned. Such is the case with many 
of the major systems studies being carried out in the 
field of energy. Such studies, often of extreme com-
plexity, give an understanding of the energy environ-
ment, and identify points of concern where action is 
likely to be needed. But for effective decision, it is 
necessary to explore the consequences of alternative 
courses of action. This will often again call for analysis, 
but the manager can no longer be divorced from the 
process. Through comments and criticism as the work 
proceeds, the analysis is changed and improved. But 
the process works both ways; in time the analysis 
will also change the understanding and knowledge of 
the manager. It is not an unusual experience for an 
ORASA WOiker to find that his model, once com-
plete , is no longer necessary. By then the manager has 
already adapted so that he can out-think the model. 
He has a new understanding. 
The question of understanding arises, however, 
even in problem solving situations. There are few 
occasions wher, one is able to incorporate every 
relevant factor into a numerical analysis. In most 
cases, the decision-maker has to weigh the so-called 
'imponderables' against the analytical findings. How 
can he do this? Only through 'understanding', the 
achievement of which should be part of the research . 
The point must not be taken too far; it is the 
essence ofORASA that problems should be solved 
and that the decision-maker should be helped. The 
phrase 'problem solving' contains the spirit of the 
subject. In practice, however, it can too easily degen-
erate into an approach that denies the realities of the 
decision-making process . The achievement of true 
understanding is often both a higher and more 
realistic goal. 
Near truth No. 2 - models are central to ORASA 
It could be argued that the one concept that dis-
tinguishes the work of the ORASA analyst from 
others who presume to study decision problems and 
advise on their solution is the central position which 
the ORASA worker gives to the use of models. Most 
other people who try to help managers depend, to a 
large extent, on their experience of the subject area 
concerned, their knowledge and their reputation . The 
engineer, the economist and the financial analyst 
come before the manager as professional experts . In 
the area of their professional competence they claim 
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to have authority. They alone have qualifications and 
the skills to explore questions that lie within that area 
of competence. The ORASA man is different. It 
could be argued indeed, that he is a professional 
ignoramus. His expertise lies not in his knowledge of 
the particular subject area under consideration, but 
rather on his ability to obtain and sift evidence, to 
analyse, to construct models , to interpret. The valid-
ity of what he has to say depends on the accuracy of 
his data and the reliability and range of validity of his 
models. It is essential that the model is exposed for 
public viewing, that its assumptions can be criticised 
and the results obtained from it tested against reality. 
The model may be very simple or extremely complex, 
but it needs always to be there and open for examina· 
tion. 
The importance of models to the ORASA analyst 
can not, therefore, be understated. Quite apart from 
the fact that they provide some kind of guarantee of 
objectivity (although models sometimes conceal an 
outrageous partiality) they have many other func-
tions which are vital to the analyst. In the first place, 
they provide an essential basis for a dialogue between 
the analyst and the manager. Thus, if information is 
to be obtained from the manager by question and 
answer, it is more than likely that the rather abstract 
questions that the analyst asks are only half answered . 
1bis is not because of unhelpfulness or laziness on the 
part of the manager, but from a lack of understanding 
of the assumptions and implications that lie behind 
the questions. We all reinterpret what we hear and the 
manager's frame of reference may be so different 
from that of the analyst that he is unaware that his 
personal reinterpretation substantially alters the true 
meaning of the question. Even if he grasps that ques-
tion he may be unable to give it a full answer , 
without realising that the half answer which he gives 
will be misleading to the analyst. As a consequence, 
when the information provided by the manager is fed 
into the model it will give answers that are unaccepta-
ble. In many instances , this is the time when the real 
dialogue can begin - for the attempt to understand 
why the answers are unacceptable forces questions 
and answers to be reconsidered . For this reason, the 
dialogue that the model generates is often a more 
important output of the analysis than any recom· 
mendations that the analyst may make . 
The model is also important because it makes 
experiment possible . It is the curse , but unavoidable 
curse , of management that decisions have to be made 
and adhered to without adequate recourse to experi· 
men! , i.e ., without being able to test the relative effi· 
cacy of alternative policies. This happens partly 
because the complexity of affairs is often such that 
one could hardly explore adequately the conse· 
quences of one potential decision, let alone many, 
but more particularly because experimentation as it is 
understood in the natural sciences is usually not 
possible in social systems. One action whether experi· 
mental or not alters the situation in significant ways 
and automatically rules out many other alternatives 
forever. If the situation , or part of it, can be modelled 
some of the difficulties in the way of experimenta-
tion can be overcome. 
So, the model ensures objectivity; it makes it 
possible to have a useful dialogue with management , 
thus promoting their understanding, and it makes 
feasible the testing of alternative hypotheses. Can 
there be any serious question as to its central posi-
tion? 
The answer to this question can best be given 
anecdotely . A colleague of mine at the Interational 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis was recently 
giving a seminar, one in a series in which we have 
been trying to explore and discuss the overall meth· 
odology of our work . He drew a diagram as in Fig. I 
to explain the very different kinds of problems which 
we were trying to tackle. At the right-hand side of the 
diagram he wrote down a number of tasks which were 
concerned with the technique oriented , more 
mathematical part of our research . Topics such as 
non-linear optimization , econometric modelling, etc ., 
etc . At the left-hand side he wrote down a number of 
big problems, Energy, Food , Risk , Environment , etc. 
These are all topics on which we are engaged on a 
programme of research . As these are, in one sense , 
extremes of the work we undertake, it might be 
implied that they represent extremes of a continuum 
- that in the middle of the box there were some 
problems of topics which had an element of bigness 
but were directly making use of the techniques. This 
might be through case studies. I rather unkindly sug-
gested that this was a wrong perception of the situa-
tion. The things written down were all conceptualiza-
Energy 
Food 
Risk 
Environment 
Optimization 
Econometric modelling 
Gaming 
Fig. I. The range of problems tackled at 1.1.A .S.A. 
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tions and generalizations . There is , for example , no 
such thing as a Food problem or an Energy problem. 
The reality with which we have to deal is people and 
nations who are hungry and cold, and a decision-
making machinery which is either unable to cope or, 
more horrifying, simply not trying. At the heart of 
all the conceptualization to which the model building 
activity of the ORASA worker is devoted, is reality -
a reality which is not even a clearly defined problem 
but rather what Ackoff (3) has called a 'mess' -
signified by distress and unease and by unmade deci-
sions. The 'mess' is central, not the model. 
Let me give one more example . My own team 
at 1.1.A.S.A., concerned with Management and Tech-
nology , are looking at another conceptualization , 
'Problems of Scale '. As we have studied the prob-
lem the more difficult and the more complex it has 
become. Indeed, from the analysts point of view 
there are many distinct problems of scale. It could be 
argued, therefore , that these different problems 
should be handled quite separately by different 
people. In academic terms this argument may be 
sound, but from the manager's point of view there 
remains the one problem. Whether he has to build a 
plant, to reorganise his firm, or build a hospital, he 
has, at an early stage of his planning, to answer one 
simple question - "How big?" . That is his problem . 
It does not help to be told that it is ten problems. 
You must start at the beginning and advise him how 
Fig. 2. The ORASA process. 
to find out which of the ten he has, or how to com-
bine the elements of five of those problems which are 
probably relevant to his question. 
It is for this reason that I say that the statement 
that 'models are central to ORASA' is a dangerous 
misconception, for it places the model and the model 
builder in a position of precedence which they do not 
deserve . At the centre of ORASA you do not find the 
model nor even the problem , sin1ply a 'mess', a situa-
tion of unease which may, or may not , call for action 
on somebody's part. The model is essential but it is 
not central. 
The distinction between centrality and essentiality 
is not just a question of playing with words , it is 
fundamental to the methodology of operational 
research and applied systems analysis . It is so funda-
mental that it seems worth adding yet one more 
simplified diagram to the many which have been put 
forward to try and describe what we are trying to do. 
A diagram to describe this is set out in Fig. 2 . We 
start with unease , a concern , a need for action. Then, 
through the acquisition of facts, through knowledge 
acquired over the years (often in many disciplines, 
such as economics, technology, social science), and 
through the use of analytical techniques, we are able 
to construct a model. This model leads to under-
standing on the part of those concerned with the 
taking of decisions, and that understanding will then 
lead to action and change . That is what our subject is 
all about. We started from a mess in the real world 
that needs improvement: we end with change, in that 
same real world. 
4. Near truth No. 3 - problems can and must be 
defined (uniquely and invariantly) 
One of the most important warnings that can be 
given to a young analyst is "Aim at nothing in partic-
ular, and that is what you will achieve". Much of the 
training of an analyst needs to be devoted to such 
topics as the question of problem definition, the need 
to define clear objectives, and the necessity of 
checking that the work remains directed towards the 
original objectives. You will see this in most work 
undertaken for organisations where it is necessary to 
prepare detailed terms of reference at the outset of a 
study and agree these with management. Even in 
academic circles, most research grants are only pro-
vided after a detailed statement has been made of the 
problem to be tackled and the methods to be em-
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ployed in its solution. Problems not only can be 
defined, they are. 
The need for such care hardly needs explanation. 
There is nothing more distressing, at the end of a 
lengthy and exhaustive study, than to find out that 
the results are of no interest to the management con-
cerned . Alas, it often happens. Perhaps the most 
common reason for this is that the tenns of reference 
were not adequately defined in the first place, or 
insufficiently criticised by the management con-
cerned . This may be said to be the fault of the 
manager but the blame must really be put on to the 
analyst. The manager may well have little idea of 
what the analyst proposed to do, and he simply may 
not have had the time to interpret the language in 
which the proposals were expressed. He may have 
taken the analyst on trust and wrongly assumed that 
he knew what he was doing. In any case, the wrongly 
defined problem leads to an unusable solution . 
Another common fault that leads to unusable recom-
mendations arises from the fact that as the analyst 
gets involved with a problem, he begins to under-
stand it differently. As his understanding changes, the 
direction of the research starts to change so that in 
the end he is. tackling a different problem from the 
one described in the terms of reference. It may well 
be that the problem he ends up studying is a more 
relevant or more important problem than the original 
one . But if it is not the problem that the manager 
wanted solved, the answer, however interesting or 
valuable, is liable to meet with a refusal or rejection. 
But this very example, which shows the need for 
precise tenns of reference and the need periodically 
to refer back to them, also shows that we are dealing 
with a near-truth rather than a full truth. We are 
saying that as an analyst proceeds with his investiga-
tion he may understand the situation _differently and 
need to redefine the problem. It is only one step 
further to realise that if a different analyst were to 
undertake the study, he - with his different experi-
ence and perceptions - would define the problem 
differently and propose a different solution. If you 
doubt this, you have only to discuss the matter with 
any research group that has had to survive the trauma 
of having the people concerned with a investigation 
leave half way through. The chance of success for the 
whole study is reduced simply because the replace-
ment team invariably see the problem in a different 
way. Thus, in the same situation different people will 
define the problem differently ; even the same person 
may define the problem in different ways at different 
times. 
The reason for this is , of course, that the starting 
point for applied research is seldom a single uniquely 
defined problem. The starting point is more com-
monly a situation causing unease and requiring some 
improvement. Thus a firm may be losing money, a 
manager may have to take action on some staff 
matter, a government may be facing an energy crisis. 
The situation demands action, it is not well defined ; 
different people will indeed define it in different 
ways, and thus suggest different possible ways of 
studying it so as to reach a conclusion. Moreover , the 
actual situation may change from week to week, 
being affected by external conditions, or perhaps by 
internal decisions made within the organisation. The 
purpose of the analyst is to understand and to 
explore the consequences of various actions that 
could be taken . But, there is not a unique problem 
that could be exactly agreed by all analysts and which 
will stay invariant with time. All the analyst can do is 
define the problem, identify its relationship to the 
overall 'mess', and ensure that the work he is doing 
continues to be related to the real needs of the situa-
tion as time progresses. If we fail in this, our near 
truth quickly degenerates into a lie. 
S. Near truth No. 4 - models are partial representa-
tions of reality 
The basic concept of modelling derives from the 
assertion that the model is a statement, expressed in 
fonnal tenns that can be openly discussed and 
analysed, of the underlying structure of some part of 
reality . Thus, a simulation model may reflect the flow 
pattern of ships unloading at a port , or the behaviour 
of a queue at a supennarket. Such models are not 
thought of as complete representations of reality ; 
indeed, the only complete representation of reality is 
reality itself. Invariably they omit certain parts of the 
process under consideration . Such an omission may 
be deliberate for a number of reasons. It may be that 
a conscious decision is made to confine the analysis 
to certain aspects of the overall situation ; it may be 
that the analyst simply does not know how to model 
certain aspects (say, the human interactions); it may 
arise from the need for simplification. Whatever the 
reason, if the assumptions are clearly stated and the 
deficiencies of the results noted and commented on , 
then the analysis can remain valid. It is accepted, by 
both analyst and policy-maker, that the model only 
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represents a part of the overall reality. Sometimes, of 
course, the analyst finds himself in trouble when the 
simplifications that he has introduced are unaccepta-
ble, whether to other analysts or to the people who 
have to operate in the real world. This may invalidate 
his whole approach. 'How can we be expected to 
believe your answers' the managers may say 'when 
you are looking at average flows in situations where 
everything is dominated by short term variations, or 
where there are significant correlations between 
factors previously assumed to be independent?' . 
Attempts to cope with decisions like this lead to 
more and more complex models which try to take 
account of these points of criticism but in doing so 
usually introduce very many more parameters, make 
further assumptions, thus increasing complexity in an 
exponential manner. Accordingly, the analyst soon 
finds himself tottering on the edge of a slippery slope. 
In order to try to be more realistic and improve his 
credibility he is tempted to produce models that are 
in fact inherently less credible. This dilemma lies at 
the heart of applied systems science. Extremely com-
plex situations remain extremely complex, despite 
our ability to build models . Models do not reduce the 
complexity of real situations, either in reality or in 
the perceptions of managers and decision-makers. 
One way out of this situation is to cease to strive 
for the one single model or even the attempt to build 
a single family of such closely related models that all 
internal communication can be made by way of the 
computer. (A disaggregated model remains a single 
model from this point of view.) For example, most 
corporate planning departments have a series of 
separate models exploring different parts of the 
overall situation. Each model may be an adequate 
Fig. 3. The role of ORASA in relation to the real and model 
systems. 
representation of some small part of the overall 
reality, and will have been designed in such a way 
that information and understanding derived from it 
may be used to assist in the analysis of some other 
model. This combination of models greatly facilitates 
that understanding of the overall situation which 
makes good planning possible . It is, however, neces-
sary to understand that this collection, or suite, of 
models is not a representation of that whole reality 
that constitutes the organisation and its whole 
environment. It is not so planned, and it in fact, can-
not operate in this way . What we have in fact is a 
'real' system and a 'model' system whose parts may 
relate to each other in a clearly defined (though not 
necessarily 1-1) manner, but where the overall 
systems do not relate. This relationship can be 
represented in Fig. 3, which also illustrates the differ-
ent roles that I see as being undertaken by the ORASA 
analyst and the model builder. In my view, the 
ORASA analyst interacts closely with the real world 
and draws on knowledge and information from as 
many sources as possible, including the information 
obtained from the model system, in order to help 
improve the performance of the real system. 
Although, in many cases the analyst and model 
builder may be the same person, it is essential for him 
to understand and identify his separate functions. 
A second method that is used to try and under-
stand the behaviour of very large systems is to replace 
the real system by some abstraction of it and to 
model the abstraction . The result can be extremely 
informative, but it does not provide us with a 
representation of reality, not even a partial one. I 
believe this distinction to be extremely important, 
and some explanation may be needed. I see a 'partial 
representation', as a good model of part of reality, 
which attempts to be complete for certain aspects but 
deliberately ignores others. Thus an analysis that 
operates in terms of weekly averages - rather than 
daily variations - or one which explicitly ignores 
human factors are both genuine partial representa-
tions of reality . Many large models which are cur-
rently the source of much debate, e .g., most global 
models , or econometric models which discuss tech-
nology as if it were a statistic , are models of abstrac-
tions. They are important in assisting our under-
standing, but they are not representations of part of 
reality. When an attempt is made to pretend that they 
are, the potential user of the model is in danger of 
being seriously misled. 
So once again we find ourselves with a dangerous 
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near-truth. All the models I have mentioned can be of 
major value in the ORASA task ~f developing under-
standing and improving decision processes. But their 
exact meaning and range of validity must be under-
stood by their interpreters - in particular their rela-
tionship to reality must be very fully explored . Their 
relationship with reality may be more distant than 
you think. 
6. Near truth No. 5 - tactics and strategy are entirely 
separate 
The near-truths which foll.ow are more related to 
the practice of the subject than to its fundamental 
structure, but they are no less important for that. The 
fifth near-truth is concerned with the separation of 
tactics and strategy, and its importance stems from 
the debate as to whether ORASA should concentrate 
on being immediately useful (tactics) or should con-
centrate on the "big" issues (strategy). This debate 
has raged since I entered the subject, and was in 
existence long before then . One school of thought 
claims that the only way to obtain the confidence of 
decision-makers is to assist them with day-to-day 
problems. If ORASA can solve the tactical problems, 
where the effect of the analysis can easily be seen, 
management will be encouraged to give them the long 
term strategic problems as well. The other school 
argues that such studies are dealing with relative 
trivia. The important matters for an organisation or a 
country are matters of strategy - not how to do 
something but what to do. They believe that the 
ORASA man who deals with tactical problems may 
save small sums of money, but will never make a 
major impact on the organisation for which he works; 
he will always be the technical back-room expert to 
be called upon when the manager requires . The 
strategist laments that the tactician will never get to 
study the fundamentals, which is what the scientist 
should primarily be concerned with . The tactician, on 
the other hand, points out that the strategist all too 
often stays with his head and feet high in the clouds, 
with devastating results when organisational gravity 
returns to normal . 
It is interesting to note that this debate is quite 
different from the traditional debate between 
academics and practical men , since academics may be 
equally accused of spending too much time devel-
oping over-sophisticated mathematical techniques for 
the solution of tactical problems, as they are for 
having their heads in the air and only looking at very 
general concepts. As usual the academic cannot win, 
but at least we have an interesting realignment of 
allies. 
In the context of this argument, the truth in our 
fifth near-truth seems almost self-evident. Tactics 
are concerned with the short term, with decisions 
which have to be made as the problems arise . ORASA 
can only help in such tactical studies if they have 
already been immersed in the problem in detail, so as 
to have developed the analytical techniques neces-
sary to work out answers quickly. Strategy, on the 
other hand , is evolved as a process over a period of 
time . The evolution depends on policy analysis and 
understanding of the general background situation. 
Decisions are seldom taken rapidly or without a good 
deal of background preparation and widespread dis-
cussion. Clearly ORASA has a contribution to make 
to tactics and strategy, but the commonly held view 
seems to be that quite different talents are needed for 
the two kinds of work , different data bases, different 
peer groups - in fact they are entirely separate. My 
experience leads me to believe that such a separation 
is false and dangerous. 
We faced this problem in the National Coal Board 
OR group some years ago, when we set out to estab-
lish an Area Systems Group, whose main purpose was 
to provide a service to the operating Areas of the Coal 
Board. (Previously the main effort of the team had 
been directed towards Headquarters problems.) At 
first sight, therefore, we were proposing to build up a 
group of tactical experts within a team that con-
sidered itself to be largely devoted to strategic prob-
lems. It soon became clear that there was a danger 
that the two groups would develop quite separately, 
both in terms of temperament and intellect. Inevita-
bly the implication was that the Area Systems staff 
v.<JUld be considered as the inferior. This was some-
thing we could never accept . Indeed , if one studied 
the work of the headquarter's teams, much had 
always been of a tactical nature . Tactical problems 
had been identified that were common throughout 
the Board, and we had set out to devise means which 
would improve the ability of individual managers in 
the Coal Board areas to handle them. Equally, a 
number of the problems that were tackled in the 
Board's production Areas were of an undeniable 
strategic quality . For example , an Area is responsible 
for the construction of new collieries and reconstruc-
tion of old ones - which means looking ahead for 
ten to twenty years . We simply could not separate 
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tactics and strategy in terms of level in the organisa-
tion. Moreover, we had already found that it was 
impossible to undertake a sensible analysis at the HQ 
policy level without a full awareness of the tactical 
situations that would arise when those policies were 
put into practice . Conversely, it was not possible to 
develop good tactics unless one was fully aware of the 
strategic implications of their decisions. What was 
true of the analysis was true of the analysts them-
selves. We often found that the analysts were more 
aware of the overall situaticn than the decision-
makers at the different levels. We established a 
deliberate policy of interchanging staff between the 
various functions. We would not allow one person to 
say 'I am a headquarters strategy man' and another to 
say that he was only concerned with Area level prob-
lems. Anyone who achieves a senior position within 
the OR team has first to show that he is good t:nough 
to work at both levels, and we believe that much of 
the team's success has depended on this. 
These beliefs have been reinforced by subsequent 
experience, that the distinction, in kind, between 
tactical and strategic issues is largely artificial. The 
tools may be different but no two tactical or strategic 
problems use the same tools either. The researcher 
who tells me that he is not interested in tactical prob-
lems is in my belief simply saying that he is not inter-
ested in application and reality. Equally, the 0 RASA 
worker who wishes to stay at the tactical level is 
showing himself to be unwilling to face up to the real 
challenges of the systems approach. 'Tactics and 
strategy' is one of many dichotomies which attempts 
to divide up the world in which we have to live. It is a 
useful aid to teaching but a dangerous misconception 
in practice - it could be the death of ORASA. 
7. Near truth No. 6 - all rigorous thought can be 
expressed in mathematical tenns 
The ORASA worker is, or should be, proud of the 
scientific rigor of his work. He likes to think that 
what he does is logical, based on empirical data, ob-
jective, and verifiable. Of course, the experienced 
analyst is not so naive to believe that the methods 
and tools that he has acquired in the course of this 
traditional training are adequate for the solution of 
problems in social organisations. Nevertheless he finds 
it distressing that he cannot judge himself by the 
criteria that, he believes, are applied to the physicist 
or chemist. (The fact that the methodology of the 
traditional 'hard' scientist also does not stand up to 
rigorous criticism based on the above four criteria is 
no consolation .) 
One of the main reasons for this - though cer-
tainly not the only one - is that the ORASA analyst 
finds that he is dealing with social systems which 
exhibit unpredictable, and even irrational, behaviour. 
Naturally enough, the first move of the 'hard' analyst 
has been to tum to the social scientist for under-
standing, advice and help . Too often he is disap-
pointed. He fmds, first of all, that the social scientist 
has developed his own language which is no less 
obscure and no less unintelligible to the non-expert 
than his own more mathematically based jargon. He 
finds that the social scientist has, of necessity, had to 
abandon what he has always believed to be the basic 
methods of science and develop his own methods of 
developing hypotheses and verifying them. He finds, 
above all, that the social scientist cannot reduce com-
plexity - as he tries to do - by discarding 'inessen-
tials' and reducing all else to the formal logic of 
mathematics. In retaliation, or is it self-defence, he 
rejects the work of the social scientist as immature, 
unscientific and irrelevant to serious analysis . 
To add to his concern he fmds that the rejection is 
mutual. His rationalist approach is anathema to the 
social scientist since it is quite unable to describe the 
processes that are at the heart of the problems to be 
solved. His tendency to revert to mathematics as a 
substitute for thought, his inability to articulate ideas 
- all disqualify him from fruitful dialogue with those 
who take part in political processes and exclude him 
from serious consideration as a person with a con-
tribution to make in policy formulation . This 
tendency towards rejection by the social scientist is 
reinforced by the extreme naivity ~hich is revealed 
when the typical ORASA worker attempts to discuss 
such issues as the question of implementation. For 
twenty years or more I have been attending con-
ferences in operational research and systems analysis 
and there has always been a group of 'old hands' 
bemoaning their colleagues' lack of understanding of 
the process of management and the necessary condi-
tions for successful interaction . Well and good. But 
they are making the same comments as twenty years 
ago, and must sound to their younger colleagues - as 
well as to any social scientists who happen to be near 
- like discontented have-beens repeating old proverbs. 
Too often the comments are entirely lacking in seri-
ous intellectual content, and reveal that the small but 
not insignificant literature on the subject has not 
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been read. In fact, for some extraordinary reason, 
despite the admitted importance of the subject the 
complainants abandon the intellectual rigor which 
they believe to be so essential in the 'analytical' part 
of their work. 
This is distressing for a number of reasons. In the 
first place it implies that the essence of ORASA is not 
scientific - since the science. is confined to the hard 
analysis - but rather an art dominated by hunch, 
instinct, and 'je ne sais quoi'. We all know that 
'inspiration' or 'hunch' remains an essential element 
of all true scientific discovery. And as I have already 
said, no two analysts take a problem in quite the 
same way. But that does not mean that the process 
cannot be planned, disciplined and checked. In fact 
the study of process (both in analysis and in decision-
making) is perhaps the key element in moving 
ORASA towards true intellectual maturity. 
We are fortunate that we live in a time when the 
study of process is just beginning to move forward. In 
the USA, Churchman and Ackoff have pioneered 
thinking of this kind - more recently fundamental 
work has been undertaken elsewhere, e.g., by 
Boothroyd in the UK. At last, we are seriously trying 
to understand the process of analysis. But note that 
the study of process is difficult. The literature is hard 
to read and understand; its reference points are often 
philosophy and logic rather than traditional science; 
mathematics takes a back seat. The serious student 
finds his powers of rigorous thought stretched to the 
limit. 
Similar studies of the decision process are in rela-
tive infancy. Many studies of decision-making are 
undertaken, of course, but decisions are too often 
seen as matters of personal or group psychology 
rather than as questions of process. Yet in major 
organisational issues, the process is often dominant 
and the skilled ORASA worker will be trying to iden-
tify those points in the process where he can make his 
impact. He can do so scientifically , but only if he is 
drawing on the full range of knowledge from all fields 
and accepting and understanding the basic concepts 
on which it is processed. 
I have talked as if the problem is that of the 'hard' 
analyst educating himself or being educated by social 
scientists. I do this because that is the common pat-
tern - though it is exciting nowadays to see that 
there are an increasing number of 'soft' analysts 
trying to come the other way. But the traditional 
ORASA worker will, in general, find that the first 
step will lie with himself. He must re-educate himself 
to understand the very great deal that has been 
learned by social scientists, to appreciate the differ-
ent and often successful methods of approaching of 
problems that have been used by psychologists, 
sociologists, historians and even lawyers. We may 
believe that we have a vision of how some of the main 
problems in our society should be approached, but 
that we cannot make an adequate attack on many of 
these problems unless we join in with people whose 
knowledge and expertise lies in the 'soft' sciences. We 
shall only be able to join with them if, in the first 
place, we learn to understand their language, and 
secondly, understand and accept the validity of their 
approach. 
8. Near truth No. 7 - ORASA is a science 2 
I am prepared to start the discussion of my last 
near-truth by claiming one absolute truth, that 
ORASA is scientific. (Assuming, of course, that we 
can reach any agreement as to what the scientific 
approach may be.) We have already referred to the 
key features of the scientific method as generally 
understood: logic, grounding in real data, objectivity 
and verification. We have also referred to the fact that 
in practice these four criteria have been found to be 
far from absolute; there remains a great deal of argu-
ment and debate as to what the scientific method is. 
Perhaps we should refer to the four basic features as 
ideals rather than laws. It is essential that both 
managers and peers are satisfied that we accept these 
ideals and work as closely to them as may be 
humanly possible . In my experience managers are 
well able to distinguish between real departures from 
the ideals an.d the quibbling deviations that the 
scientists argue about. Within the limitations imposed 
by our subject we must be as scientific as we can get. 
But the scientific approach does not make a 
science. A science is based on a distinct body of 
knowledge , separable from other bodies of knowl-
edge. There have, of course, been those who have 
tried to convert ORASA into a science within the 
2 When this paper was first presented in Amsterdam, the final 
near-truth was chosen to fit more closely to the originally 
announced title of my talk. I believe that 'ORASA is a 
Science' is a more appropriate choice (it was suggested to 
me by Roger Collcutt), which still enables me to retain a 
total of seven. The relationship to Seven Deadly Sins is not 
coincidental. 
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body of mathematics; after all in many university 
departments, operations research is a sub-section of a 
mathematical school. To those of us who believe that 
ORASA is concerned with the process of decision-
making and policy formulation no such single body 
of knowledge will suffice. In undertaking any real 
applied study the ORASA man must be able to 
draw on all relevant knowledge, whether that lies in 
the 'science' of physics, engineering, history, econom-
ics, psychology or law. On the other hand, his true 
ORASA skill means that he is usually not an 'expert' 
in the subject fields with which he may be concerned. 
To be an 'expert' one is normally expected to know 
everything about a field of knowledge, and also to 
have a developed skill in applying that knowledge to 
problems. It is that standardized, highly developed 
skill, which is so often the death to an ORASA 
investigation. This is a fundamental difference 
between the ORASA researcher and the traditional 
scientist. To the traditional scientist it is inconceiva-
ble that anybody should undertake an investigation at 
the boundaries of knowledge unless he knows all the 
work and the literature in the field . It is anathema to 
him to suggest that someone may come in from out-
side and quickly obtain the necessary parts of such 
knowledge and incorporate it into a wider study. Yet 
that is precisely what the analyst has to do . We have 
thus identified two significant differences between 
the ORASA analyst and the traditional scientist. He 
is able to transcend the limitations of approach 
imposed by a discipline, and he draws on many 
expert skills not his own . So, of course, does the good 
scientist when placed in such a situation - but when 
he does he is in danger of ridicule from his disciplinary 
peers. It is 'unprofessional'. At the same time ORASA 
workers are often experts in some particular tech-
nique or field of application . It is not always an 
advantage to them. 
Where then does the special skill and knowledge lie 
that enables an analyst to say with pride that what he 
does is ORASA. It is not simply the area of applica-
tion - say complex systems or social organisations. 
Both of these topics can be treated as traditional 
science. The real skill lies in the approach and the 
process, in being scientific - not in practicing a 
science. 
Having started this section with a high claim, let 
me conclude with another. I believe that the prob-
lems of management and decision-making in an age 
dominated by technological change need a new and 
radical approach. I do not believe that the ideal type 
of investigator to lead us forward will be found in the 
image of Isaac Newton or his natural successors of the 
19th century. Rather, it is to be found in Leonardo 
da Vinci - Renaissance Man, artist and scientist - the 
man who is interested in everything and sees it to be 
not only permissible but necessary to draw on all 
possible knowledge to tackle the problem that he has 
in hand. It is a tragedy of the educational system that 
has been developed in the Western world that 
'Renaissance Man' is more likely to arise again from 
the ranks of those with training in the sciences, rather 
than in the arts. For scientists can still show an ability 
and interest in the arts whereas those trained in the 
arts seldom have the basic education for the reverse 
to happen . But it is only a possibility, even for the 
scientist; our educational systems do their utmost to 
prevent it. 
It may be that I have allowed by personal pre-
judices to cloud my case in these last few sentences. 
But the dangers inherent in this near-truth are best 
perceived in the heart rather than the mind. May we 
always be scientific - but may we never be confined 
within the boundaries of a profession or science. 
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